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Abstract
According to the constructivist international relations 
theory, the social structure of international politics not 
only influences an agent’s behavior, but more importantly 
constructs its identities and interests. Are there any 
change happened to China’s national identity, interests 
and behavior after its participation in the global course on 
tackling climate change? If so, what are these changes? 
This article uses content analysis to examine the identity 
and interests change in China’s climate diplomatic 
discourse from 1999 to 2014 and analyses the data 
related to China’s action on curbing climate change in 
the same period. After analyzing, this article finds out 
that there is a gradual change of China’s identity: From a 
developing country sharing “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” to a major developing country that is 
willing to take responsibilities proactively under the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. 
As for its national interests, it finds that China’s national 
interests change in three aspects, namely, level of 
importance, nature and identities of developed and 
developing countries in its national interests network. It 
also finds the change in China’s behavior: China’s carbon 
intensity per unit of GDP rises slightly during the 1999-
2005 period, but it decreases year by year after 2005, 
which demonstrates China’s fulfillment of its commitment 
to the world. It is argued that there is a process of inter-
constructive practices among China’s identity, interests 
and behavior. 
This article analyzes the change of national identity in 
the speeches of China’s leaders and relevant ministries in 
international conferences on climate change and China’s 
Action Reports and White Papers on tackling climate 
change (1999-2014). Then it analyzes China’s national 
interest and behavior concerning climate change in the 
same period and the relations among the three, namely 
identity, interest and behavior of China. This article adopts 
a content analyzes of these speeches and reports (1999-
2014) to depict China’s national identity change. Then it 
analyzes the discourse related to China’s national interests 
in these materials. Next, it analyzes China’s behavior in 
tackling climate change by looking at the data released 
by the U.S. Energy Information Administration and PBL 
in the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. 
After that, it analyzes the relation among China’s identity, 
interests and behavior through a comparative study of the 
three.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change, a pure scientific problem when it was 
first discussed, has evolved into a major global political, 
economic and diplomatic issue, which has witnessed a 
wide disparity between the developed and developing 
countries on how to cope with it. China’s guiding 
principle is to shoulder “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” as a developing country. However, with 
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the rise of China’s national strength and its international 
status, China’s stance on climate issues in its diplomatic 
discourse has been undergoing constant changes. How 
does China’s identity evolve? Why does it happen? This 
article attempts to answer these two questions from 
constructivist perspective.
There are many researches on China’s national identity 
building. Li (2012) thinks the implementation of China’s 
foreign policy depends on the overall structure caused 
by the interaction among agents in the international 
system. In the international system, a nation’s identity is 
a determining factor of its interests, stance and methods 
to achieve its interests. China always sticks to its position 
as a developing country, but with the rise of its national 
strength, China is increasingly recognized by the world as 
a “major power.” These two roles require totally different 
participating mechanisms in international interaction and 
generate completely different results, so that China is 
faced with a dual-identity dilemma (Li, 2012, pp.4-20). 
Qin (2009, p.2) contends that in modern times, a major 
problem faced by China is how to view its relation with 
the international system. What are we? What is China? 
These questions have puzzled China for more than a 
century. Identity change reflects the change in China’s 
relation with the outside world, or to be more specific, it 
is the result of participation in the international system. 
Therefore, to analyze the reasons for the change of 
national identity, one needs to discuss how international 
environment influences China’s interactions with other 
agents. Xu (2008, pp.40-55) analyzes China’s effort 
in building an identity of a responsible major power 
at the conceptual level and the practical level from the 
perspective of power, and he argues that China’s effort is 
constrained by an external dilemma and internal tensions.
However, researches on Chinese national identity in its 
climate diplomacy are very limited, and among them very 
few have used empirical analysis method. This article 
attempts to overcome these shortcomings.
1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
As an application of sociology to international relations 
and an outgrowth of critical international relations 
theory, constructivism has changed the configuration of 
international relations theory in 1990s. The analysis in 
this article mainly draws on theoretical insights offered 
by Wendt (1999), Katzenstein (1996), Guo (2001), and 
Qin (2012). Wendt emphasizes the systemic effects of 
international politics on states and pays special attention 
to structure. Contrasting to neorealist who views 
structure as distribution of material capacities among 
states, Wendt views it as “distribution of ideas.” He 
further refers to shared ideas as culture, which is part 
of the structure. Meanwhile, Wendt defines norms as 
“shared beliefs” (Wendt, 1999, p.185), which tend to be 
one form of culture. On some occasions, Wendt defines 
culture as “shared knowledge” and norms and rules as its 
manifestations (Ibid., p.253). Constructivists believe that 
norms, as part of the structure, have both constitutive and 
causal effects on agents. As Peter Katzenstein says in The 
Culture of International Security:
[We] use the concept of norm to describe collective expectations 
for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some 
situations norms operate like the rules that define the identity 
of an actor, thus having “constitutive effects” that specify what 
actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular 
identity. In other situations norms operate as standards that 
specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In 
such instances of norms have “regulative” effects that specify 
standards of proper behavior. Norms thus either define (or 
constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, or they 
do both. (Katzenstein, 1996, p.5)
Guo (2001) further defines the concept of norm as the 
international political and cultural norm. In sociology, 
culture is discussed at a personal level, and in political 
sociology, culture’s functions are mainly measured on a 
national base; while in international political sociology, 
culture is often related to the international community or 
the international society. International political culture 
mainly refers to the minimum consensus reached by the 
international society at a certain stage over the basic 
issues related to the existence and development of human 
society, such as international relations, international 
politics, international order, international morality, war 
and peace, survival and development, international 
exchanges, international authority and international 
governance (pp.298-313).
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Then, does China change its national identity, interests and 
behavior over time through participation in international 
mechanism to cope with global climate change while it 
under the guidance of “shared concept”? What are the 
changes? What is the relation among them? This paper 
attempts to answer these questions: 
RQ 1: How does China change its national identity in 
its climate diplomacy?
RQ 2: How does China change its national interests in 
its climate diplomacy?
RQ 3: How does China change its national behavior in 
coping with climate change?
In Wendt’s theory on the relationship among identity, 
interest, and behavior, an agent’s identity affects its 
interest, interest is rooted in identity, and identities and 
interests determine states’ behaviors. Identities and 
interests are socially constructed by domestic politics and 
the international system. Furthermore, Wendt argues that 
“[a]gents themselves are on-going effects of interaction, 
both caused and constituted by it” (Wendt, 1999, p.316). 
He shows that identity can be produced and reproduced 
through the interactions among states, particularly through 
cultural selection such as imitation and social learning. 
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More specifically, he argues that identity is rooted in 
an actor’s self-understanding and others’ representation 
of the actor. Wendt put it plainly, “identities and their 
corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in 
response to how actors are treated by significant others” 
(Ibid., p.327).
Wendt pays special attention to the significance of 
international systematic culture (or shared knowledge, 
expectation, concept, etc.) on nations, which shows a 
holism methodology. In terms of world view, Wendt 
disapproves total material determinism of advocating the 
value of ideas. He recognizes the existence of material 
factors, but he stresses that the objective factors can only 
produce influence on the behavior through the common 
idea shared by the community. The social structure of 
international politics not only influences an agent’s 
behavior, but more importantly constructs its identities 
and interests.
Another theory related to the analysis of this article 
is the processual constructivism theory of Qin Yaqing 
incorporates two key Chinese ideas: “process” and 
“relations” in the structural constructivism. It focuses 
on interactive practices among states, and emphasizes 
the independent ontology of social processes which play 
an important role in constructing international norms 
and state identities. Qin contends that China would 
have a peaceful rise through its practice of joining and 
understanding the international community, which in 
turn would generate its identity change and a peaceful 
development (Qin, 2012, preface, p.11).
Based on the above theory, this article proposed a 
hypothesis to examine the relation among China’s national 
interest, its behavior of participating in the global course 
on curbing climate change, and its national identity.
RH: There is a processual constructive relation among 
China’s national interest, its behavior of participating 
in the global course on curbing climate change, and its 
national identity.
3. METHOD
This article analyzes the change of national identity in 
the speeches of China’s leaders and relevant ministries in 
international conferences on climate change and China’s 
Action Reports and White Papers on tackling climate 
change (1999-2014). Then it analyzes China’s national 
interest and behavior concerning climate change in the 
same period and the relations among the three, namely 
identity, interest and behavior of China. 
This article adopts a content analyzes of these 
speeches and reports (1999-2014) to depict China’s 
national identity change. Then it analyzes the discourse 
related to China’s national interests in these materials. 
Next, it analyzes China’s behavior in tackling climate 
change by looking at the data released by the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration and PBL in the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency. After that, it analyzes 
the relation among China’s identity, interests and behavior 
through a comparative study of the three.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Change of National Identity 
This article conducts a content analysis of the speeches 
and reports (1999-2014) to depict China’s national 
identity change. Table 1 shows China’s national identity 
in its climate diplomatic discourses mentioned above.
Table 1 
China’s National Identity in Its Climate Diplomatic Discourses (1999-2014)
Year National identity (times mentioned)
1999 A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (1)A developing country (1)
2000 A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (1)A developing country (1)
2001 A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (1)A developing country (1)
2002 A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (3)A developing country (1)
2003 A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (1)A developing country (1)
2004
A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (1)
A developing country (1)
A responsible country (1)
2005 A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (1)A responsible developing country (1)
2006 A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (1)A responsible developing country (1)
2007
A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (5)
A responsible developing country (3)
A country that shoulders its responsibility within its ability (1)
2008
A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (4)
A responsible developing country (1)
A country that is responsible to its own people and people in other countries (1)
To be continued
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Year National identity (times mentioned)
2009
A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (7)
A country that is responsible to its own people and people in other countries (7) 
A responsible developing country (1)
2010
A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (4)
A responsible developing power (2)
One of the developing world powers (1)
2011
A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (4)
A country that is responsible to its own people and people in other countries (2)
A responsible developing world power(1)
2012
A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (4)
A country that is responsible to its own people and people in other countries (2) 
A developing world power (1)
2013
A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (2)
A country that plays a constructive role (1)
A highly responsible country (1)
A developing country (1)
2014
A proactively responsible country (6)
A responsible world power (3)
A country sharing “common but differentiated responsibilities” (2)
A developing country (1)
Continued
As can be seen from the table, China’s national identity 
has changed during the 1999-2014 period and the change 
can be categorized into three phases:
Phase One (1999-2003): China emphasizes that it is a 
developing country sharing “common but differentiated 
responsibilities”.
Phase Two (2004-2009): While maintaining the 
same stance as Phrase One, China stresses that it is a 
responsible country.
Phase Three (2010-2014): While maintaining the same 
stance as Phrase One, China stresses that it is a proactively 
responsible world power.
The above analysis answers RQ1 and shows that 
China’s identity becomes more positive and confident in 
its climate diplomatic discourse.
4.2 Change of National Interests 
National interest refers to all things that meet its people’s 
material and spiritual need. At the material level a country 
needs security and development, while at the spiritual 
level a country needs to respect and recognition of 
the international community. In this research, national 
interests are defined by a country’s demand and aspiration 
at both levels.
Researches have realized that the only sound 
foundation for a country’s sustainable foreign policy 
is a clear sense of its national interests. According 
to a report made by The Commission on America’s 
National Interests, there are four levels of national 
interests: fundamental, vital, important and minor. The 
fundamental interests refer to the basic conditions of 
national survival and continuation, and they are related 
to a country’s fundamental system and values, and its 
principle of happiness. The vital interests are those that 
must be safeguarded, or else the country’s mission of 
maintaining world peace, security and happiness will be 
severely affected. The important interests are those that 
cannot be disrespected, or else the country’s ability of 
safeguarding its fundamental interests will be damaged. 
The minor interests are those that if damaged temporarily, 
the country’s fundamental interests will not be severally 
affected (Ni, 2006, pp.254-255).
This article analyses China’s national interests by 
examining their level of importance and finds that in the 
period from 1999 to 2006, China regards environmental 
protection and curbing climate change as important 
interest for 17 times, as vital interest for only 2 times. 
From 2007 to 2014, China regards it as important 
interest for 40 times, as vital interest for 37 times. The 
results show that China accords more importance to 
environmental protection. 
The article then examines the nature of China’s 
national interests. Are they exclusive interests, mutual 
benefits or common interests of all people in the world? 
After a content analysis of the above mentioned material, 
this research discovers that in the period from 1999 to 
2006, exclusive interests of China are mentioned 16 times 
while the global common interests are mentioned only 3 
times; from 2007 to 2014, China’s exclusive interests are 
mentioned 44 times while the global common interests 
are mentioned 34 times. It is quite obvious that China 
emphasizes the global significance of its actions on 
tackling climate change.
The study then examines the identities of other 
countries in China’s national interest network. Wendt has 
analyzed three types of anarchical culture: Hobbes culture, 
Locke culture and Kantian culture and he contends that 
they construct different identity relationship: enemies, 
rivals and friends respectively. A country as a member of 
the international community can only acquire its identity 
and national interests through learning. Because there 
are mainly two camps of countries in the climate change 
negotiations, this research uses “developed countries” 
and “developing countries” as keywords to search for the 
national identities of related countries and lists them in 
Table 2:
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Table 2
The Identities of Other Countries in China’s National Interest Network
Year Developed countries (to the other camp) Developing countries (to the other camp)
1999 Irresponsible partners Victims to be helped
2000 Possible partners Victims to be helped
2001 Possible partners Possible partners
2002 Unkind partners Victims to be helped
2003 Potential partners Countries need help
2004 Irresponsible partners Victims to be helped
2005 Irresponsible partners Countries need help
2006 Irresponsible partners Countries need help
2007 Partners that should be more responsible Countries need help
2008 Partners that should be more responsible Countries need to act
2009 Partners that should be more responsible Countries need to act
2010 Partners that should be more responsible Countries need to act
2011 Partners that should strengthen dialogue and cooperation Partners that should strengthen dialogue and cooperation 
2012 Partners that should strengthen cooperation Partners that should strengthen cooperation
2013 Partners that should strengthen cooperation Partners that should strengthen cooperation 
2014 Partners that should strengthen cooperation Partners that should strengthen cooperation 
Table 2 shows that in China’s national interests 
network, the identity of the developed countries changed 
from the irresponsible, unkind partners to partners with 
whom for developing countries to strengthen cooperation. 
It also shows the change of the identity of developing 
countries: from victims to be helped to countries need to 
act and cooperate with the other camp.
The above analysis answers RQ2. In summary, 
China’s national interests change in three aspects. First, 
in terms of level of importance, China accords more 
importance to environmental protection. Second, in 
terms of the nature of China’s national interests, China 
emphasizes more the global significance of its actions on 
tackling climate change Third, by observing the identities 
of developed and developing countries in China’s national 
interests network, this paper finds that China emphasizes 
more the importance for developing countries to fulfill 
their responsibilities and to strengthen cooperation with 
developed countries.
4.3 Change of National Behavior1
The most important measure China takes as a responsible 
country in tackling global climate change is to steadfastly 
pursue a low carbon economy. Energy conservation and 
remission reduction, the primary approaches towards the 
1 See Building a resource-efficient and environmental- friendly 
society. Retrieved from http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/
shiyiwu/1125609.htm
objective low carbon economy is realized by bringing 
down energy consumption per unit GDP1, a strategy that 
is in keeping with China’s role as a developing country.
China, itself as a developing country, has always 
taken the same side with other developing countries in 
requesting the developed countries to take the lead in 
cutting carbon dioxide emissions, without committing to 
cut emissions themselves. Until the end of 2007, China for 
the first time promised to take measures aiming at slowing 
down climate change, but not without certain conditions. 
In the same year, China had taken a series of measures 
to deal with climate changes, among the most noticeable 
are formulating China’s national program to address 
climate change, establishing a national steering group 
for coping with climate change and enacting some laws 
and regulations. In the year 2009, China has for the first 
time promised on its own accord to cut carbon dioxide 
emissions by 40% to 45% per unit GDP by 2020. What 
China has done in keeping this promise? The present 
study has analyzed Chinese carbon intensity data from the 
year 1999 to 2011 issued by the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) 2. GDP is calculated according to 
PPP of the year 2005 and each unit represents the amount 
of carbon dioxide emission (metric ton) per 1,000 USD 
GPD.
2 Energy Information Administration. Retrieved from http://www.
eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=91&pid=46&aid=31
&cid=regions&syid=1999&eyid=2011&unit=MTCDPUSD
Table 3
China Carbon Emission Intensity (CCEI) (1999-2011)
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
CCEI 2.2 2.2 2.1 2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2 1.9 2 1.9 1.9
Note. * GDP is calculated according to PPP of the year 2005 and each unit represents the amount of carbon dioxide emission (metric ton) per 
1,000 USD GPD.
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Table 3 shows from the year 1999 to 2002, China’s 
carbon emission intensity decreased somewhat. From 
2003 to 2005, the figure stood at a high of 2.2 or 2.3. 
From 2006 to 2011 China’s carbon emission started to 
decrease, with the figure for the year 2011 being 1.9, 
representing a decrease of 17.4% in comparison with 
2005. Since the data issue by EIA had stopped updating 
since 2011, I have instead referred to China’s carbon 
intensity data of the year 2014 issued by PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency3. According to this 
report, China’s carbon emission intensity was 750, 700, 
and 650 respectively for the consecutive 2011 to 2013, 
with each unit representing the amount of carbon dioxide 
emission produced in turning out 1,000 USD worth of 
GDP at the PPP of the year 2011. The above analysis 
answers RQ3. As is shown by the data, China’s carbon 
emission intensity was decreasing year by year from 2011 
to 2013.
DISCUSSION
Analysis of the shifts of China’s identity, national 
interests and behavior has shown that China has asserted 
increasing confidence in the expression of national 
identity. While maintaining the principle of ‘a common 
but differentiated responsibility’ and holding on to 
a stance appropriate to a developing country, China 
endeavors to build its identity as a big and responsible 
country. Considered alongside China’s national interest at 
the same period, the issue of dealing with climate change 
is gaining prominence in China’s national strategy 
and is inherently motivated by the goal of sustainable 
development and pertinent to the key interest of the 
country and its people. To honor its promise in tackling 
global climate change, China has reduced its carbon 
emission year by year since it promised to take measures 
to slow down climate change under certain conditions 
since 2007. In a way, China did live up to its promise to 
its people and the world to be a responsible country in 
dealing with global climate change.
Viewed from the perspective of constructivism, 
China’s national identity, national interest and behavior 
in its climate diplomacy are mutually supportive, lending 
a constructive force to each other. Simply paying lip-
service will not do in building China’s national identity. 
To match one’s word with his/her deeds has been a 
much valued virtue for the Chinese people since time 
immemorial. If China’s promise is not kept, the national 
identity it seeks to create will be like a house built on 
sand. The international community acknowledges China’s 
identity as a big responsible country when and only when 
it takes concrete measures to deal with climate change, 
3 PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. Retrieved 
from http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/trends-in-global-co2-
emissions-2014-report
in keeping with its foreign propaganda. Actions will have 
an impact on national interest, which in turn influences 
the construction of national identity. Conversely, the 
change of national identity and interest will have a close 
bearing on the change of national behavior. According to 
process construction theory proposed by Qin (2012), the 
three factors are in a dynamic relationship of mutually 
constructing. 
 
National identity National interests  
 
 National behavior  
Interacting
Mutually constructing
Figure 1
Relationship Among National Identity, Interests and 
Behaviors
Similarly, Wendt defines three degrees to which 
norms can be internalized by states: The first degree 
of internalization refers to the situation in which states 
observe cultural norms “because they are forced to,” the 
second degree of internalization “because it is in their 
self-interest,” and the third degree of internalization 
“because they perceive the norms as legitimate” (Wendt, 
1999, p.250). The above analysis shows China is actively 
joining international organizations dealing with climate 
change, accepting international climate system based 
on UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
Kyoto Protocol and taking actions to honor its promise. 
China’s national behavior indicates it is willing to 
conform to norms. Xu (2008, p.53) also thinks that China 
has behaved differently from its past since mid-1990s in 
multilateral mechanisms.
As it is reflected in China’s climate diplomacy 
discourse, the construction of China’s national identity 
is closely related to its national interests, its active 
participation in international systems as well as the 
concrete actions it takes to keep its promise in tackling 
global climate change. The mutually constructive 
interaction among national behavior, national interests and 
identity within the constraint of international norms has 
brought about the change of China’s national identity. 
CONCLUSION
Through a content analysis of discourses in China’s 
climate diplomacy from 1999 to 2014, this study manages 
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to find gradual changes of China’s national identity. The 
general trend emerging from the analysis is that, though 
the principle of shouldering common but differentiated 
responsibility remains unchanged, China has turned from 
a developing country with very limited commitment 
to a big and responsible country, ready to take more 
actions suitable to its international standing. This study 
has also explored the causes leading to the changes 
from the perspective of constructivism, using empirical 
methodology and locates the interactive relationship 
among national interests, behavior and identity as 
the driving force for the changes of China’s national 
identity.
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